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Reflections on the Manifold Means of
Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Too Much,
Too Little, or Just Right?
By Joseph P. Bauer*
Lately, much attention has been given to the scope of the
antitrust laws. This discussion has two overlapping components: (1)
consideration of the substantive doctrines specifying the behavioral
or structural changes that are or are not unlawful and the appropriate
methodology; and (2) analysis for making those determinations with
attention given to the appropriate vehicles for enforcing the antitrust
laws. Some argue that the antitrust laws proscribe activities that are
either pro-competitive or at worst benign.' Further, they assert that
the multiplicity of antitrust enforcers and enforcement devices has
resulted in undue burdens, including excessive cost, time delay, and
forestalling of legitimate, procompetitive behavior.
The discussion of this second component of antitrust
enforcement involves two discrete, but overlapping, inquiries. The
first, at what might be described as the "macro-level," is whether the
aggregate of enforcement activities is beneficial or deleterious. The
second inquiry, which inevitably dovetails with the first, looks rather
at the distribution of antitrust enforcement. Among the many
questions raised here are: (1) whether we have correctly allocated
authority to the various governmental and private enforcers; (2)
whether we have the correct balance of enforcement through
litigation or other compliance mechanisms; (3) whether non-
American parties (both private and governmental) play an appropriate
role in antitrust enforcement; and (4) whether the range of remedies
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Visiting Professor, Emory
University School of Law, spring 2004. B.A. University of Pennsylvania 1966; J.D.
Harvard Law School 1969. I gratefully acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Jill
C. Rush, Emory Law School Class of 2005, in the preparation of this Paper.
1 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984).
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invoked in the event of antitrust violations appropriately maximizes
consumer welfare. These questions are the focus of this article.
I. Balancing the Extent of Antitrust Enforcement
While complaints about the expansive nature of antitrust
enforcement and the expansive distribution of antitrust enforcers
deserve close attention and respect, I believe that, on balance, the
extent and characteristics of antitrust enforcement are correct. The
antitrust laws have served us well for over a century,2 and so the
burden must be on critics and challengers to demonstrate, including
through a proffer of empirical evidence, that alleged over-
enforcement truly is a problem. But, to start the discussion, it will be
useful to canvass the range of devices that, in the broadest sense,
result in "enforcement" of the antitrust laws.
First, I start with a brief word about what is meant by
"antitrust laws." The Clayton Act defines this term to include the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. 3 Both practitioners and companies which
2 Critics will assert that I have assumed away much of the problem. The precise
value of the antitrust laws, in preserving or advancing competition and the social and
consumer benefits that flow therefrom, may not be calculable. For an example of
recent empirical evidence of the benefits from the antitrust laws, see Jonathan B.
Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27 (Fall,
2003). In his article, Professor Baker identifies a number of specific benefits to
consumers from particular enforcement actions involving a variety of forms of anti-
competitive activities. He estimates that "the annual welfare benefits from deterring
the exercise of market power through the antitrust laws as they are enforced today
could readily exceed 1 percent of GDP, or $100 billion per year." Id at 45.
Other evidence of their value may be derived from the fact that the core statute,
the Sherman Act, has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment at the end
of the nineteenth century, and other evidence is the continued funding that the
antitrust agencies receive from the Congress. Both of these demonstrate that both our
polity and our elected officials believe in the continued important role played by the
antitrust laws. Further evidence of the value and importance of antitrust is the global
expansion of antitrust, not only in Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia, but also in
many developing countries as well.
Nonetheless, I recognize that this does not answer the essential, secondary
questions: What should the antitrust laws look like? Who should enforce them, and
how much?
3 Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2004). That definition also includes a few
provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, which were later codified as part of the
Sherman Act.
The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, §
3, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c), is an amendment to the original
[Vol. 16: 4
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are subject to the potential restraint of these laws would doubtless
also include, at a minimum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.4 This Act makes unlawful "unfair methods of
competition" and encompasses not only Sherman and Clayton Act
violations, but also some, admittedly ill-defined, incipient antitrust
violations.5 Moreover, with the growing importance of the states in
enforcing antitrust policy, we should also include not only state
antitrust statutes,6 but perhaps also state "baby FTC" Acts. I will
discuss the Illinois Brick doctrine8 in more detail below, but it is
noteworthy that notwithstanding the federal prohibition on suits by
indirect purchasers, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia,
accounting for more than half of the American population, allow
indirect purchasers to bring suit against sellers9 under their state
antitrust !aws.'0 Finally, because the activities of many American
Clayton Act, § 2. Because this statute protects competitors as well as (or perhaps even
notwithstanding any injury to) competition, many analysts assert that it is not a true
"antitrust" statute. Thus, for these critics, any enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act is "overenforcement." Although this article is not an appropriate forum to defend
the Act, see generally Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The Robinson-Patman
Act: A Look Backwards, A View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (1986).
4 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2004).
5 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) ("the
Commission has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without
proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other
provisions of the antitrust laws.").
6 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 ("Cartwright Act") (2004); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. § 340 ("Donnelly Act") (Consol. 2004).
7 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (2003) (prohibiting unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and stating the legislative intent
that consideration and weight in interpretation of the statute should be given to
Section 5 of the FTC Act and judicial construction thereof); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
93A, § 2 (2004) (same).
8 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See generally JOSEPH P.
BAUER, 11 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 78.8 (1998).
9 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (rejecting
argument that Section 4 of the Clayton Act or Illinois Brick doctrine preempt action
against indirect purchasers under state law).
10 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, n.3
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript in author's possession) (identifying 26 jurisdictions
that have Illinois Brick repealer statutes, and 4 states that permit such actions either
by judicial decision or under consumer protection statute). See generally Joel M.
Cohen & Trisha Lawson, Navigating Multistate Indirect Purchaser Lawsuits, 15
ANTITRUST 29 (Summer 2001); Kevin J. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall
2004] 305
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companies are increasingly subject to scrutiny by non-American
antitrust enforcement bodies, the laws of numerous foreign countries
and multinational organizations (such as the European Union) are
also relevant "antitrust laws."
In canvassing the wide range of enforcement vehicles, I begin
by looking at the identity of the "enforcers." Although enforcement is
both litigative and non-litigative, it is the former that has received the
most attention and criticism. Who can bring an action to enforce the
"antitrust laws"? The universe of enforcers includes both private and
governmental entities, and the latter agencies are not only both state
and federal, but also include non-American enforcement agencies.
I. Domestic Watchdogs: Antitrust Enforcement at
Home
At the governmental level, the two most important
enforcement bodies are the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")." As described
more fully below, their enforcement responsibilities are overlapping
rather than identical. Most significantly, only the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DOJ") can obtain criminal sanctions for antitrust violations,
while on the other hand, only the FTC can enforce Section 5 of the
FTC Act. 12 Nonetheless, because these two agencies have manyshared, and to some extent duplicative' 3 responsibilities, antitrust
Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34 (Summer 2001); William H. Page, The Limits of State
Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1999).
11 See generally Thomas Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust
Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 84 (1990) (description by
former Assistant Attorney General of evolving role played in enforcement by
Antitrust Division); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The
Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998) (noting the
increasingly regulatory nature of enforcement efforts undertaken by two federal
agencies, and diminished importance of litigation and courts in defining antitrust
norms).
12 Although I included Section 5 of the FTC Act among the "antitrust laws," see
supra note 4 and accompanying text, this statutory provision may be enforced only by
the Commission, and not by private parties. See, e.g., Morrison v. Back Yard
Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1996); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243,
1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Holloway v. Bristol-
Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13 As only one example, the pre-merger filings required by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act must be submitted to both agencies, and thus staff members in both
306 [Vol. 16: 4
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appears to be the only body of federal law that is simultaneously
enforced both by an agency in the executive branch and by an
administrative agency.
While the alternative of criminal prosecution for antitrust
violations is infrequent, and is almost exclusively reserved for bid-
rigging and other forms of price-fixing, it represents an important
part of the arsenal for seeking compliance with the antitrust laws.
Persons and corporations who violate the Sherman Act are subject to
imprisonment and fines. 14 The sight of A. Alfred Taubman, the
extremely wealthy chairman of the board of Sotheby's, the world-
famous auction house, convicted and sentenced, at the age of 78, to a
one-year term of imprisonment and a substantial fine for participating
in a price-fixing conspiracy, 15 doubtless sent a message to other
business executives about the risks and penalties for this kind of
behavior.
The states are playing an increasingly important role in
enforcing the federal antitrust laws as well as their own laws. State
attorneys general can push to enforce the antitrust laws in situations
where the federal government might be reluctant or unwilling to
proceed. Most notably, the nine states that declined to sign off on the
settlement negotiated by the DOJ and the other plaintiff states in the
Microsoft litigation are a good illustration of the important role of
state attorneys general.' 6 The significance of this enhanced level of
agencies may be allocating resources to perform at least an initial review of the same
transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2004).
14 The Sherman Act provides that violations constitute felonies, and "shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or if any other person,
$350,000, by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. The Criminal Fines Improvements
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, provides in the alternative that "[i]f any person
derives pecuniary gains from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to
a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the
greater of twice the gross gain or twice the rooss loss.... ." 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2004).
The record for fines assessed was set in the vitamins price-fixing conspiracy, in
which the defendants agreed to pay nearly $1 billion in fines. See David Barboza,
Tearing Down the Facade of "Vitamins, Inc.," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, § 3, at 1
(describing overall settlement); John Wilke & Susan Warren, Vitamin Firms to Pay
U.S. $725 Million, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1999, at A3 (describing settlement by two
defendants).
15 Carol Vogel & Ralph Blumenthal, Ex-Chainnan of Sotheby's Gets Jail Time,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2002, at B I (imposing fine of $7.5 million).
16 See Steve Lohr, Microsoft's Top Officials May Testify to Help Fight
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2002, § 1, at 30.
2004] 307
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enforcement is even more dramatically illustrated by the occasional
challenge to merger activity by state attorneys general, 17 because
non-governmental enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act has
been severely constricted by the decisions in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.18 and Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc. 19 Today, companies contemplating mergers must not only take
account of guidelines issued by the Antitrust Division and the FTC,
but also the guidelines issued by the National Association of
Attorneys General.2 °
With the exception of the merger area, the possibility of
private enforcement of the antitrust laws is undoubtedly of more
concern for companies contemplating various contractual
arrangements with their competitors, customers or suppliers, or
undertaking certain unilateral behavior than is government
enforcement. In a typical year, private complaints account for 90-
95% of all antitrust actions.
Although it is of comparatively little importance, one such
form of these private suits are actions that may be brought by
17 See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) (holding that
divestiture is a form of "injunctive relief' to which state is entitled in action brought
under Section 16 of Clayton Act); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d
1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001); N.Y. v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 862 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), affid, 14 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1993). See also California ex rel. Van de Kamp v.
Texaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 1147 (1988) (seeking, under state statutes, to enjoin Texaco's
acquisition of the California assets of Getty Oil pursuant to merger between two
companies).
18 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
19 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
20 See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen'l
(1993), available at http://www.naag.org/issues/pdf/at-hmerger-guidelines.pdf (last
visited May 4, 2004). See generally Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State
and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9
CONN. J. INT'L L. 501 (1994).
21 See generally John J. Flynn, Which Past is Prolog? The Future of Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 879 (1990).
22 In 2003, there were a total of 762 civil antitrust actions commenced in the
federal courts. Private filings accounted for 729 of these cases or 95.6% of all such
actions. Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts 2003, Table C-2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendix[USDistrictCourtCivil.pdf (last visited
May 4, 2004). In that same year, there were 11 criminal cases commenced involving
a total of 14 defendants. Id. at Table D-2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendix/USDistrictCourtCriminal.pdf (last
visited May 4, 2004).
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governments acting in a private capacity. Both the federal
government 23 and state and local governments may sue for injuries
they have suffered in their proprietary ca acity.24 Since the passage
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino ("HSR") Act2P in 1976, state attorneys
general may also sue as parens patriae for monetary relief on behalf
of natural citizens residing in the state.
26
Far more important, of course, as potential private plaintiffs
are individuals or corporate entities, who have allegedly been injured
as consumers, competitors, customers or suppliers, or perhaps in
some other capacity, by a defendant's antitrust violations. Private
parties may seek monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. A
private plaintiff seeking monetary relief must show that it was
"injured in his [sic] business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . ."- If the plaintiff is successful in
making this showing-which carries with it requirements of proving,
among other elements, causation, antitrust injury, and standing2 -8 it
may recover three times the amount of its damages, plus costs and
attorney's fees.29 Without having to meet quite the same high burdens
23 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2004).
24 See, e.g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is "person"
authorized to bring action under Section 4 of Clayton Act); Chattanooga Foundry v.
City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality may bring action for treble
damages); Illinois v. Sangamo Const. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 858-60 (7th Cir. 1981) (state
is "person" entitled to cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, as well as to
treble damages). See also Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn.
1966) (discussing, in actions brought by states in their proprietary capacity following
criminal and civil proceedings brought against same defendants by federal
government, benefits of tolling provisions of Section 5(b) of Clayton Act). But see
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (denying standing to
state to sue for damages for general injury to its economy).
25 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1390.
26 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2004). See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota
Distribs. Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court's denial
of defendants' motion for summary judgment in parens patriae action by five state
attorneys general and D.C. corporation counsel); New York v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (approving settlement of parens patriae
action by attorneys general of all 50 states).
27 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2004).
28 See generally JOSEPH P. BAUER, 11 KINTNER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ch.
78(1998).
29 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2004).
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of antitrust injury and the like, a plaintiff may also obtain injunctive
relief to protect it from threatened harm from the defendant's antitrust
violation.
30
The reasons for incorporating private suits as an essential part
of the regime for enforcing the antitrust laws are familiar. The
potential specter of paying treble damages, plus attorneys fees and
costs, in the event of an antitrust violation greatly enhances the
deterrence component of the antitrust laws. Payment of those
damages compensates the victims of those violations. 31 Those victims
are likely to be among the first to learn of the violations, and they
may have better access to evidence thereof. The treble damage
component of the potential award serves to recognize the punishment
function of the private remedial scheme. And, private lawsuits not
only increase the volume of enforcement, but shift the expense of
enforcement away from the governmental agencies, thereby
conserving public resources. 32 Indeed, because private enforcement is
30 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2004). Under appropriate circumstances, a private plaintiff
may be entitled, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2201 (2004), to a
judicial declaration that the defendant's conduct is violative of the antitrust laws.
Antitrust cases decided by the Supreme Court in which declaratory relief was sought
include: Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); and Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). See generally JOSEPH P. BAUER, 11 KNTNER
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 79.3 (1998).
31 It is of course arguable that the treble damage provision both
overcompensates victims and misallocates the recovery to the wrong plaintiffs. See
infra notes 93 and 96 and accompanying text.
32 See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) (describing
private enforcement as "an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting
competition"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 329, 344 (1979) ("private suits
provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department
of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations").
One argument for those asserting that there is over-enforcement of the antitrust
laws is that private parties can bring actions for substantive violations which the
government is loathe to enforce. Perhaps the leading example of this is the Robinson-
Patman Act. Half a century ago, the DOJ ceded enforcement responsibilities for price
discrimination to the FTC. However, there has been virtually no enforcement by the
Commission of that statue in the past thirty years. Although critics of the Act may
decry the "remnant" of private lawsuits, the proper remedy, if the statute no longer
advances antitrust values, would be to seek legislative repeal of the statute. The
continued failure to obtain that repeal represents a political judgment that the Act
continues to play an important role in regulating some aspects of the pricing and
distributional decisions by manufacturers and wholesalers-and perhaps that purely
Chicago School-based analysis, looking solely to the maximization of efficiency, is
not the only basis for determining the content of the antitrust laws.
310 (Vol. 16: 4
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a vital supplement to governmental actions, plaintiffs are frequently
referred to as "private attorneys general. 33
Two aspects of private litigation deserve 3?pecial attention.
Since the 1966 amendments to Fed R. Civ. P. 23,3 an increasingly
important means of private enforcement of the antitrust laws is
through the class action device. 35 Individuals, corporations, and
government entities have brought many class action suits, and have
obtained relief by litigated judgments or through settlements, running
into the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.
36
Another important phenomenon is the frequency of so-called
"follow-on" litigation.37 Whether relying on the prima facie evidence
33 See, e.g., At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 345 (1990)
(describing plaintiff which will "vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement"
as "perform[ing] the office of a private attorney general") (quoting Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542
(1983)).
34 FED. R. CIrv. P. 23.
35 For the three most recent years for which data are available, there were 213
antitrust class actions commenced in the year ending Sept. 30, 2000. Judicial
Business of the U.S. Courts 2000, Table X-5, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html (last visited May 4, 2004); 122
such actions in the year ending Sept. 30, 2001, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts
2001, Table X-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/contents.html
(last visited May 4, 2004); and 126 class actions in the year ending Sept. 30, 2002,
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts 2002, Table X-5, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/contents.html (last visited May 4, 2004). At the
end of that most recent year, there were a total of 249 antitrust class actions which
were pending; more than half of those were in two district courts-80 in the Southern
District of New York, and 48 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at Table X-
4. However, these numbers overstate the actual extent of class action enforcement,
since they doubtless include multiple classes which are initially brought against the
same defendant(s); many of them will eventually either be consolidated or dismissed.
36 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving settlement obligating defendants to pay more than $3
billion to class); Elizabeth Becker, Jury Awards Ranchers $1.28 Billion From Tyson,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at C1 (award in class action by 35,000 cattle ranchers
against country's largest beef packer); Judge OKs Microsoft Settlement with Calif,
L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2003, Part 3, at 3 (approving settlement of state action for $1.1
billion, for overcharges to consumers of software); Cigarette Makers Settle Farmers'
Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at A18 (settlement under which three
major cigarette manufacturers would pay $188 million to tobacco growers).
37 See generally Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust
Cases That Follow on Government Cases, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW
EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 329 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); Thomas E. Kauper &
Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement:
2004]
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r Vl t 38 iprovision of the Clayton Act or simply relying on the expanded
availability of offensive collateral estoppel, 9 private parties are able
to take advantage of favorable judgments in actions by the federal
government against antitrust violators to obtain private relief without
the need to reprove all of the elements of the antitrust violation.40
One component of private enforcement that has grown in
importance are actions by non-American plaintiffs. Foreign
Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163 (1986).
38 15 US.C. § 16(a) (2004); cf United States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp.
1097, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (federal government, when suing in its proprietary
capacity, may obtain prima facie benefit from prior enforcement action brought by
government).
39 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (permitting use,
under certain circumstances, of collateral estoppel by plaintiffs who were not parties
to earlier litigation).
40 See Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 917
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (describing "unprecedented number of private antitrust actions"
brought against electrical equipment manufacturers upon conclusion of government
litigation); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW MONOGRAPH 13, TREBLE DAMAGES
REMEDY 23 (1986) (indicating that 2,233 private actions were brought against
electrical equipment manufacturers).
In the wake of the settlement of the government's action against Microsoft, a
number of its competitors and customers brought follow-on treble damage actions.
The most significant of these was by AOL Time-Warner, the parent of Netscape,
which the district court and the court of appeals had found was the primary target of
Microsoft's anti-competitive behavior. The terms of the settlement of that action
included a payment by Microsoft to AOL Time Warner of $750 million. See Steve
Lohr & David P. Kirkpatrick, Microsoft to Pay AOL $750 Million to End 'Long
War,' N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at Al. See also Steve Lohr, Court Lifts Order that
Required Windows to Include Java, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at C3 (describing
Sun Microsystems' follow-on litigation against Microsoft, in which Sun seeks
various forms of injunctive relief and $1 billion in damages); Ted Bridis, Private
Suits Against Microsoft Ordered by Judges to be Handled by One Court, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 27, 2000, at 88 (ordering temporary consolidation of over two dozen private
actions).
But see In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004)
(finding that the district court's application of collateral estoppel was too broad, and
that Microsoft should be barred from relitigating only those facts which were critical
and necessary to judgment in governments' action).
In rare situations, the order of the "follow-on" litigation may be reversed, i.e., the
government may decide to proceed only after the initiation of a private action.
Compare United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 73,440 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001) (government action challenging exclusivity rules of two major credit card
networks) with SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994)
(private challenge to same behavior).
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individuals and corporations have long been viewed as "persons"
entitled to sue either for monetary or injunctive relief.41 In Pfizer v.
Inc. v. Government of India,42 the Supreme Court held that foreign
governments are also permitted to sue under the American antitrust
laws. 43 If affirmed, the decision in Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Ltd.,4 which is presently pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court, holds open the possibility of even greater enforcement by
foreign parties of behavior allegedly violative of the American
antitrust laws.
Of course, the path to riches for the antitrust plaintiff is not all
downhill and paved with gold. In addition to the obvious need to
prove the fact of an antitrust violation, courts have imposed a number
of procedural obstacles to success in a treble damage action. TheS45
most important of these is the Illinois Brick doctrine, which bars
claims other than by the direct purchaser from the defendant. In
addition, courts have imposed other increasingly onerous
preconditions for satisfying the antitrust injury and standing
requirements.46 The up-shot of these judicially created hurdles has
been substantially to diminish the potential vigor of private
enforcement.
47
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2004) (defining "persons" to include "corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by.. .the laws of any foreign country").
42 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978).
43 But see Pub. L. No. 97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (1982) (providing that with certain
exceptions, recovery by foreign governments and their instrumentalities should be
limited to actual damages and cost of suit) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(b)-(c)
(2004)).
44 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("where the anticompetitive conduct has the requisite effect on United States
commerce, FI'AIA permits suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely by that
conduct's effect on foreign commerce"), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 966
(2003).
45 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
46 See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
47 On the other hand, because, as noted above, see supra note 10, indirect
purchasers in a majority of states can bring actions under state Illinois Brick repealer
laws, some defendants may face the prospect of six-fold (or even more) damages if
they are sued both by direct and indirect purchasers.
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III. Enforcement Abroad
The most important development in the past decade affecting
the competitive behavior of American companies, has been the vastly
stepped up enforcement efforts by foreign antitrust agencies under
non-American antitrust regimes. If an American company engages in
multi-national activities-and that will be true for virtually all large
corporations-it is not unlikely that foreign antitrust agencies will be
concerned with the local effect of those companies' behavior.48
Preeminent of these is the European Union Competition Commission,
but American companies are increasingly finding their behavior
subject to scrutiny by Canadian, Japanese, Australian, and other
antitrust agencies as well.49 The inability of General Electric to
consummate its proposed acquisition of Honeywell, after that
transaction was given clearance by the Antitrust Division, because it
fell afoul of European regulators is the most prominent of these
situations.50 The attention that Microsoft's contractual restrictions
and distributional arrangements are continuing to receive in Europe,
notwithstanding the settlement of its long-standing dispute with the
DOJ and numerous states, is yet another prominent example of this
growing internationalization of antitrust norms.
51
48 As noted, for example by Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms
to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global Market, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
409 (2004); Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules-
Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
431 (2004); and Charles M. Wright & Matthew D. Baer, Price-fixing Class
Actions: A Canadian Perspective, 16 LOy. CONSUMER L. REV. 463 (2004), the EU
and several countries are considering creating or expanding private remedies under
their antitrust regimes. These laws would then give rise to claims against American
companies in foreign courts or before non-American antitrust agencies.
49 In addition to the competition laws of the European Union, the laws of the
individual member states may also apply, to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with EU law.
50 See Robert J. Reynolds & Janusz A. Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and
the GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2002); Laurence Zuckerman
& Andrew R. Sorkin, G.E. Calls its $45 Billion Bid for Honeywell All But Dead,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, § 1, at 31. See also Paul Meller, Europe Lists its
Objections to G.E. Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2003, at WI (EC identifying its
concerns about G.E.'s proposed acquisition of Instrumentarium, a Finnish
manufacturer of medical devices).
51 See Paul Meller, European Regulators Back Proposed Microsoft Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2004, at C9; Paul Meller, Europeans Reject Offer By Microsoft,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at C3.
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IV. Non-litigative Enforcement
Another far less-frequently-discussed component of antitrust
enforcement is non-litigative. However, because this method of
enforcement also has costs, although usually far less than that of
litigation, it also must be noted. These enforcement efforts
encompass a multitude of actions by governmental bodies, in advance
of, and hopefully in lieu of, administrative or judicial challenges.
Probably the most important examples are guidelines issued by
government agencies. These include merger guidelines, which have
been promulgated both by the federal52 and state authorities, 53 and
federal guidelines on joint ventures,54 foreign activities,55 intellectual
56 57property, and behavior within the health care industry. The FTC
has also acted quasi-legislatively, engaging in rule-making to
explicate its view of Section 5 of the FTC Act58 and the issuance of
52 The Antitrust Division first issued merger guidelines in 1968. See 2 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510. The present version, significantly revised from the earlier
version, is jointly issued by the two federal enforcement agencies. See 1992 U.S.
Dep't of Justice & FrC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
This version, as further revised in 1997, is available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz booklhmgl.html (last visited May
4, 2004), and is reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104.
53 See supra note 20.
54 U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among
Competitors (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf
(last visited May 4, 2004).
55 U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/intemat.htm (last visited May 4, 2004).
56 U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited May 4, 2004).
57 U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in
Health Care (1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/1791 .htm (last visited May 4, 2004).
In 1985, the Antitrust Division (in this case it was not joined by the FTC) also
issued Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. See 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105
(1985). Only eight years later, those guidelines were withdrawn. See Anne Bingaman,
Antitrust Enforcement, Some Initial Thoughts and Actions, Address Before the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Ass'n (Aug. 10, 1993) (speech by Ass't Att'y
Gen'l, announcing rescission of guidelines), in 65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 250 (Aug. 12, 1993).
58 The Commission first announced its view that it had authority to promulgate
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industry guides. 59 However, the bulk of this activity has been in its
consumer rotection role of defining "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."
Other forms of non-litigative enforcement include policy
statements issued by agencies and advisory opinions-particularly
from the Antitrust Division-in response to private inquiries about
the legality of proposed behavior. Individual enforcement officials,
including FTC Commissioners, Assistant, Associate and Deputy
Attorneys General, and lower-ranking officials, all further an
understanding about the parameters of the antitrust laws and the
range of its enforcement through speeches, newspapers and law
review articles, and other devices.
Perhaps the most important, and arguably the most costly,
non-litigative enforcement device is the filing required by the HSR
Act62 of all major mergers and acquisitions of companies, their stock
or other assets. Although recent changes and increases in the dollar
threshold have sharply reduced the number of required filings,63 there
rules on which it would rely in adjudicative proceedings in 1962. 27 Fed. Reg. 4609,
4611 (1962). Its authority to issue such rules was upheld in National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding rule providing
that failure to post octane numbers on gasoline pumps at service stations constituted
"unfair method of competition"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
In 1975, Congress amended the FrC Act, authorizing the Commission to
"prescribe-(A) interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices .... 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2004).
The FrC has also promulgated rules under the myriad of other statutes it
enforces, such as the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (2004), the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339 (2004), and
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2004).
59 "Industry guides are administrative interpretations of laws administered by the
Commission for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity
with legal requirements." 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2004).
60 The Commission's most significant use of guides to aid in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws are the Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other
Merchandising Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240 (2004), which are intended to
"provide assistance to businesses seeking to comply with sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act." Id. § 240.1.
61 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (1994),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm (last visited May 4,
2004); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm (last visited May 4, 2004).
62 See supra note 13.
63 The Act has a complicated number of thresholds which trigger the filing
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are still more than a thousand transactions for which HSR reports
must be filed each year.64 After the filing, one of the two agencies
may first demand far more detailed information from the parties (the
"second request"), which may then be followed by announced
objections to the transaction. These objections can in turn result
either in negotiations that allow an amended transaction to go ahead
(the so-called "fix-it-first" approach),65 a judicial challenge to the
transaction, or its abandonment. Here, among the costs imposed by
this enforcement regime are the mandated filing fees,66 the expenses
for legal and other services, and arguably the cost of altering,
delaying, or prohibiting transactions that were actually pro-
competitive.
Non-litigative enforcement also takes place in the private
sector. Largely because of the uncertainty and expense of litigation,
before undertaking a transaction, parties typically will discuss the
proposal with counsel for advice on its legality and on alternatives for
enhancing the chances for legal success. Prudent companies also
undertake educational programs for key employees, and audits of
their records and of their ongoing business practices, to ensure
compliance with antitrust requirements.
Finally, because the law is not static, various groups play
roles in modifying or preserving antitrust rules. Academics give talks
and write articles. Members of the private bar push for rules which
benefit their clients. Interest groups, trade associations, and lobbyists
obligation. Some of these thresholds were increased, and then made subject to further
increases by being linked to inflationary indexes, by Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-553, § l(a)(2) [Title VI, § 630(a)]. See also 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2004).
64 In the last full year prior to the change in thresholds-2000-HSR reports
were submitted for 4,926 transactions. That number fell to 2,376 in 2001 (a transition
year), and to 1,187 transactions reported for 2002, which is the most recent year for
which information is available. See FTFC & DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2002, 25TH REPORT, Appendix A (August
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/hsrannualreport.pdf (last visited
May 4, 2004).
65 See generally Albert Foer, Toward Guidelines for Merger Remedies, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 211 (2001); William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S.
Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 436-37 (2003); R.
Hewitt Pate, Antitrust Enforcement at the United States Department of Justice: Issues
in Merger Investigations and Litigation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 411, 422-23
(2003).
66 The fees range from $45,000 for the smallest reportable transactions, to
$125,000 for medium-size transactions, to $280,000 for the largest transactions. Act
of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § l(a)(2) [Title VI, § 630(b)].
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all urge changes in, or continued adherence to, substantive doctrine
and enforcement practices. Like everything else already discussed,
these too may involve a variety of costs.
V. Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?67
Given this universe, what components of this enforcement
regime might be "too much?" First, a few words about the "costs" of
assertedly excessive enforcement. 68 Costs may fall broadly into two
categories. Initially there are the measurable costs of the range of
enforcement activities just described. The enforcement agencies, both
state and federal, have budgets that might be reduced or reallocated.69
Companies facing the possibility of antitrust challenge must pay for
counseling and compliance expenses, 70 and then naturally there are
the very real costs of litigation, paid to lawyers, experts, and other
support vendors. And, if a firm is found to have violated the antitrust
laws, it probably will have to pay treble damages and/or fines. 71 Even
67 With apologies both to Goldilocks and to Voltaire, who wrote the satire,
Candide, in which Dr. Pangloss asserted that we live in "the best of all possible
worlds." We don't!
68 See Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 27, 42-43 (Fall, 2003) (estimating that "the total direct costs for the
government and private parties are approximately $1 billion annually [and]
that.. .indirect costs, while possibly substantial, do not exceed the direct costs. If so,
the total annual costs of antitrust enforcement in the United States are no more than
$2 billion each year.").
69 The President's proposed Budget for the 2005 fiscal year seeks allocations of
$206 million for the FTC (including its consumer protection responsibilities) and
$136.4 million for the Antitrust Division. See White House Unveils FY 2005 Budget
Allocations for Antitrust Division, FTC, 86 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 111
(Feb. 6, 2004).
70 Yet another cost incurred by some firms are the changes in their conduct, to
avoid detection of violations of the antitrust laws. But, like the purchase of radar
detectors, to allow persons to drive their cars with lessened fear of receiving a
speeding ticket, these expenditures are not those which society should encourage or
which should enter into the cost/benefit calculus.
71 Strictly speaking, this is not a "cost" of antitrust enforcement, but instead a
price to be paid for the antitrust violation. The single damages portion of the
monetary award is intended to compensate the victims of the unlawful conduct and to
make them whole. The punitive portion of the treble damage award, and the fines,
have the multiple functions of increasing deterrence, punishing wrongdoers, and
denying them any benefits of their ill-gotten profits. See generally Spencer Weber
Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 207
(2003).
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if the behavior in question is finally implemented by the companies,
it might be implemented only after incurring greater out-of-pocket
costs, and after a substantial delay, denying to consumers and
competitors the benefits of that practice in the interim.
Less easily measured, but arguably far more substantial, are
the costs of unwise antitrust enforcement, either because the activity
was never undertaken for fear of challenge or because it was
inappropriately prohibited after an attack by an enforcer. These latter
costs would include the merger not consummated, the joint venture
not realized, the vertical distributional arrangement not implemented,
the single-firm behavior not undertaken, or the innovative practice
not attempted.72
If the assertion of critics is that these "costs" are the product
of excessive enforcement of the antitrust laws, what specific
instances might there be of that excess? Let me touch on five broad
possibilities: (1) dual enforcement of the antitrust laws by two federal
agencies; (2) enforcement by both federal and state authorities; (3)
private as well as governmental enforcement; (4) enforcement by
foreign as well as American agencies; and (5) the range of remedies
available in the event of an antitrust violation.
VI. The Cost of Dual Enforcement
Perhaps one obvious starting point for the asserted over-
enforcement of the antitrust laws are the responsibilities shared by the
Antitrust Division and the FTC.7 3 While anomalous, and perhaps not
a system that would be crafted today if we were writing on a clean
slate, this dual enforcement has hardly proven dysfunctional or
inefficient. Indeed, the agencies have developed, over time, a series
of arrangements and agreements, both informal and more formalized,
to allocate the industries or types of activities for which they have
72 See generally Fred McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition For and Competition in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J.
1401, 1411-17 (2003) (describing greater market harm that occurs from "false
positives"-"mistakenly imposing liability on an innocent defendant"-than from
"false negatives").
13 See generally Ernest Gellhorn, Charles James, Richard Pogue & Joe Sims,
Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 694 (1990); William Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is it Time to
End Dual Federal Enforcement?, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505 (1996); David Roll, Dual
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC: The
Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075 (1976).
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primary responsibility.74 While the initial review of certain conduct
by both agencies may marginally increase governmental
expenditures, and while the less-than-identical treatment that certain
conduct may receive from the agencies may marginally increase
uncertainty, the significant benefits from dual enforcement outweigh
these slight costs.
First, over the years, each agency has developed expertise in
75analyzing particular industries or practices. Second, and more
important, the agencies are responsive to different constituencies,
giving rise to different enforcement priorities. While it is true that
both the chief officials of the Antitrust Division and the five FTC
Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, the latter officials serve overlapping seven-year terms, so that
the make-up of any set of Commissioners will frequently include
appointees of the present president's predecessors. Moreover,
because the FTC is an administrative agency rather than located in
the Executive Branch, it will be more sensitive than the Antitrust
Division to congressional desires-a matter of particular importance
when the executive and legislative branches are not in the hands of
the same party. It is undoubtedly not a complete coincidence that the
resolution by the DOJ of three of the most important antitrust actions
in the past quarter-century-the termination of a nearly thirteen-year
long action against IBM, 6 the settlement of the even longer-lasting
attack on AT&T,77 and the post-remand settlement of the Microsoft
74 In 2002, the agencies reached a tentative, formal agreement to divide almost
all of their enforcement responsibilities. Memorandum of Agreement Between the
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of U.S. Dep't of Justice
Concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigations (2002) [hereinafter FTC and
DOJ Memorandum of Agreement], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10170.pdf (last visited May 4, 2004). Because of
significant adverse Congressional reaction, and in particular from Senator Ernest
Hollings of South Carolina, these efforts were subsequently abandoned. See Yochi J.
Dreazen & John R. Wilke, Justice Department, FTC Deal Dividing Merger Reviews
Collapses, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2002, at B6.
15 For example, the FTC has had a long-standing interest in the automotive
industry and in various sectors of the health care industry, while the Antitrust
Division staff has particular expertise in the computer software, telecommunications,
and media/entertainment areas. See FTC and DOJ Memorandum of Agreement,
supra note 74.
76 See In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1982)
(describing stipulation of dismissal of "what had been one of the nation's longest
antitrust suits").
77 See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
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litigation 78-all occurred after the election of a new president of a
different political party than the one under whom the action was
originally brought. While it is largely true that antitrust enforcement
has historically been bipartisan, 9 part of that consistency may be the
product of the fact that enforcement is not solely the responsibility of
the executive branch.
80
Assertions of over-enforcement of the antitrust laws because
of shared responsibility by the federal government and the states
present two different potential concerns: officials at both levels may
be able to bring actions under the same body of law (the federal
antitrust laws), and the same conduct may subject defendants to
attack under two different, and perhaps inconsistent, legal regimes.
Expressed concern about the first overlap is a variation on the
objections to the dual enforcement by two federal agencies, or of the
ability of private parties to bring challenges to many of the same
activities as may be brought by government officials. In all of these
situations, the statutory allowance for multiple enforcers enhances the
likelihood that anticompetitive behavior will be deterred, or if
undertaken, that it will receive judicial scrutiny.8' It also minimizes
concerns that harmful conduct will go unchallenged because certain
(approving, with modifications, consent decree terminating litigation and dividing
AT&T into numerous smaller units).
78 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (after
remand, conditionally approving proposed consent decree as final judgment,
dependent upon parties' agreement to modifications proposed by court).
'9 See generally Joel Klein, Antitrust Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century,
32 CONN. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (2000) ("the amazing thing is throughout
government .. , there is wide support [for strong antitrust enforcement) from both
parties").
80 See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modem Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003) (criticizing "pendulum
narrative" to describe history of governmental antitrust enforcement, and arguing that
enforcement has been cumulative, progressive, and characterized by continuity and
adjustments based on experience).
81 Concerns about possible multiple and inconsistent enforcement of the merger
laws are diminished by coordination between the state and federal enforcers. See
PROTOCOL FOR COORDINATION IN MERGER INVESTIGATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/03/mergerco.op.htm (last visited May 4, 2004). See
generally William Baer & David Balto, New Myths and Old Realities: Recent
Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, 1999 COLUM. L. REv. 207 (assertion by two
FTC officials that recent Commission merger enforcement efforts are merely result of
applying antitrust doctrines to changed economic and industry conditions, rather than
departure from established doctrines).
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potential enforcers have desisted from suing because of political
concerns, conflicts of interest, or the expenses of litigation. Individual
states will often have different competitive interests that they seek to
vindicate, as illustrated by the refusal of some states to join the
federal government and their sister states in the Microsoft settlement.
State interests would not be adequately protected by reposing
enforcement powers solely at the federal level.
82
The possibility of suit under both federal and state antitrust
laws is the logical product of our federal system.83 Because
congressional power to enact the Sherman and Clayton Acts is found
in the Commerce Clause, federal law can only reach activities which
are "in or affecting commerce. ' 84 Were it not for state antitrust laws,
intrastate activities which harmed local competition would go
unremediated.85 State legislatures have properly permitted state
officials and private parties who are injured by anticompetitive
conduct, which if it had occurred in interstate commerce would have
given rise to a federal claim, to bring parallel actions under state
law.86 In addition, as noted above in connection with the Microsoft
litigation or certain mergers, 87 state attorneys general may choose to
challenge certain conduct or seek certain remedies where the federal
government is unwilling to proceed.88
82 See generally Joel Brinkley, U.S. and State Officials Weigh Microsoft
Remedies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at Cl (noting that, even before district court
ruling, state attorneys general disagreed among each other and with Antitrust
Division about appropriate remedy in event of finding of antitrust violation).
83 Indeed, state statutory or common law was the exclusive vehicle for
enforcement of "antitrust," or trade regulation, norms prior to the enactment of the
Sherman Act in 1890. Compare State ex rel. Att'y Gen'l v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio
St. 137 (1892) (state quo warranto proceedings, challenging defendant's abuse of its
monopoly) with Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (action
two decades later under Sherman Act).
84 See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991); McLain v.
Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
85 See generally Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in
Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1004 (2001).
86 As discussed above, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, the state may
also enforce the private remedy component of the Clayton Act, by suing, as parens
patriae, for monetary relief in behalf of natural citizens residing in the state.
87 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
88 In support of his argument that "having multiple enforcers of antitrust can
produce undesirable results," Professor Fred McChesney complains that state
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Complaints about private enforcement take various forms. At
one extreme, the lawsuit may be of marginal foundation and may be
brought in hopes of wearing down an opponent or extracting a
settlement. While these concerns are not unfounded, they are
increasingly being addressed through the willingness of judges to
grant summary judgment in antitrust cases,89 and indeed, truly
frivolous cases may be subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions. A
more substantial concern is that while a government official-
whether federal or state-weighing whether to bring an action must
take some account of the public interest in that suit, 0 a private party
arguably is concerned solely with its own enrichment. Instead of
seeking to advance the public's interest in increased competition, the
private party may be seeking to protect itself from competitors. 9' The
safeguard for this, however, is the federal judiciary. The courts have
shown no reluctance to dismiss actions before trial or to set aside
verdicts for plaintiffs on a whole host of grounds, including not only
attorneys general occasionally bring cases "in which the federal antitrust authorities
would have no interest." McChesney, supra note 72, at 1424, 1428. As an example,
he describes the multi-state actions against the manufacturers of George Foreman
grills for resale price maintenance; Professor McChesney dismisses those suits as
meritless because "[r]esale price maintenance simply has no place in the modem,
economics-based enforcement agenda." Id. at 1428. However, until the Supreme
Court overrules the Dr. Miles decision, Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (191 1),-and the Court has recently expressly declined that
opportunity, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7
(1984)--resale price maintenance remains unlawful per se. While Professor
McChesney may assert that this rule is bad law, it hardly seems inappropriate for the
states to enforce that doctrine, notwithstanding the fact that both Professor
McChesney and the federal antitrust agencies may think that enforcement of that rule
is bad economic policy.
89 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986) (upholding grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment; "if the
factual context renders [plaintiffs'] claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply
makes no economic sense-[plaintiffs] must come forward with more plausible
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary"). See generally
Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986); Rudolph
Peritz, Theory and Fact in Antitrust Doctrine: Summary Judgment Standards, Single-
Brand Aftermarkets and the Clash of Microeconomic Models, 45 ANTITRUST BULL.
887 (2000).
90 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2004) (authorizing FTC to bring action "if it shall
appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it.. .would be in the interest of the
public").
91 See generally Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the
Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551 (1991).
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the plaintiff's failure to prove that the defendant violated the antitrust
laws, but also such enforcement-related deficiencies as the failure to
prove antitrust injury, which is defined as "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful.,
92
While critics might point to the unusual case where treble
damages arguably have been inappropriately allowed, I have already
argued elsewhere93 that the federal courts have actually erred far
more often in the other direction, finding an absence of standing by
or antitrust injury to persons who have been genuinely injured by
undoubted antitrust violations. While this article is not an adequate
vehicle to explore the issue adequately, I reiterate my contention that
one of the more egregious obstacles to an appropriate level and
distribution of private enforcement of the antitrust laws is the Illinois
Brick rule, which denies recovery to downstream, indirect purchasers
who would otherwise be able to show real harm, while often
permitting windfall recovery-trebled-to direct purchasers who
may have been able to pass on any overcharge resulting from the
defendant's antitrust violation.
94
The fourth broad category of arguable over-enforcement is the
increasing, and potentially duplicative, attention to conduct or
transactions from both American and foreign enforcers. There is
some irony in these complaints. Americans are proud of their culture
and their laws, and are all too happy to export not only Microsoft
software and Boeing airplanes outfitted with General Electric engines
and Honeywell avionics, but also our ideals of democracy and
competition. Indeed, we have long decried the protectionism and
absence of competition that has far too long prevailed both in
developed and developing countries. Therefore, the adoption by other
countries of vigorous antitrust regimes is, in the long run, clearly in
the best interests of American companies and the American economy.
However, we could not have expected that those regimes
would have either merely adopted our antitrust laws wholesale, or
would always reach the same conclusions of legality or illegality for
any particular arrangement or transaction. Encouragement of multiple
competition regimes must countenance two consequences. First,
92 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)).
93 Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriersfor Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 437 (2001).
94 See id. at 443, 452.
[Vol. 16: 4
Reflections on Antitrust Enforcement
firms operating multi-nationally will frequently incur the additional
costs of avoiding potential antitrust exposure and of confronting
potential challenges in multiple jurisdictions. Second, it is
unsurprising that in certain circumstances, one regime will find
unlawful the same conduct which was upheld by another. While
General Electric may decry the fact that European competition law
has forced the abandonment of an acquisition which was given the
green light by its home country authorities, 95 such occasional results
are the inevitable result of the application of different standards by
different enforcement authorities. While cooperation amon the
enforcement authorities may make such incidents less frequent, 6 and
while experience may lead to greater convergence of American and
other antitrust regimes, some "competition" in the development and
enforcement of antitrust law is, on balance, healthy for the
maintenance of competition in world markets.
Finally, are the remedies available in the event of a violation
of the antitrust laws appropriate? This, of course, raises issues both of
the aggregate amount and the distribution of modes of enforcement.
Does the award of treble damages result in under- or over-
compensation of victims and under- or over-deterrence of borderline
activity?97 Should treble damages be reserved only for certain kinds
of violations-perhaps only that conduct which is subject to per se
liability-with other violations only entitling the plaintiff to single or
doubled damages? 98 Does the potential liability of each defendant for
95 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96 See generally Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement:
Governance Issues and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUDIES 433 (2002)
(urging consideration of multilateral antitrust enforcement agreement within WTO).
97 See generally Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust
Damages, 70 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1995); Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages
Reform, 33 ANTrrRUST BULL. 233 (1988); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble"
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 01-o ST. L.J. 115 (1993); William M. Landes,
Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983); William
H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REv.
2151 (1990); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985).
98 There are already several situations under present law in which recovery is
limited to single damages. As noted above, see supra note 43, with certain
exceptions, recovery in actions by foreign governments and their instrumentalities is
limited to actual damages and the cost of suit. The National Cooperative Research
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815, amended by the National Cooperative
Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117, confers limited
immunity on certain research, development, and production joint ventures, including
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all of the harm suffered by the plaintiffs, with limits on the ability to
obtain contribution,99 unduly pressure parties to settle and constrain
the ability of parties to defend marginal or exaggerated claims?
By contrast, should there be greater use of the criminal side of
antitrust-with more frequent prosecutions, and with the government
asking for longer prison terms and larger fines-in order to increase
deterrence of truly harmful behavior? Does the Supreme Court's
approval of arbitration as a means of resolving antitrust claims' °°-
with the possible denial of the full panoply of procedural rights and
of treble damage remedies-undermine the strength of private
enforcement? Finally, my favorite hobby-horse: Does the Illinois
Brick rule, by frequently allowing windfall compensation to some
plaintiffs and denying compensation to other, truly harmed would-be
plaintiffs, best achieve the dual goals of deterrence and
compensation?
This fifth area, perhaps as much as any of the others, has
elicited strong reactions, and may be the one most in need of
attention and change. 101 Here, as with the first four categories, further
study and empirical evidence is called for to determine the
appropriate nature of enforcement.
provisions allowing them to limit their liability to actual damages and costs after
notification to the DOJ and the FTC of their intent to cooperate. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303,
4305 (2004). The Export Trading Companies Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1233, similarly limits claims against qualified companies that receive a
certificate of review from the Office of Export Trade in the Department of Commerce
to actual damages and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b) (2004).
99 See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981)
(holding that antitrust laws do not permit a right of contribution).
'0o See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
639 (1985) (upholding arbitration as means of resolving antitrust claims arising in
international context, but declining to decide whether arbitration is appropriate for
antitrust disputes arising from domestic transactions). See also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi in non-
antitrust case for general proposition that antitrust cases can be arbitrated); Kotam
Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724, 728 (1 1th Cir. 1996)
(enforcing agreement to arbitrate antitrust claim arising in domestic setting) (en
banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1110 (1997); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437,
1441 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994).
10' See generally Waller, supra note 71 (noting that inconsistency and
unpredictability of cumulative public and private remedies for antitrust violations
result in under-enforcement in certain cases and over-enforcement in others).
326 [Vol. 16: 4
2004] Reflections on Antitrust Enforcement 327
VII. Conclusion
This article has admittedly only scratched the surface of the
multitude of antitrust enforcement modalities. In some situations, it is
arguable that inappropriate costs have been incurred and that
competition has suffered because of over-enforcement. On the other
hand, I believe that, at a minimum, there is less than an appropriate
level of private enforcement because of judicially imposed limitations
and conditions. However, on balance, the system that has evolved
after more than a century of the antitrust laws probably yields about
the right amount and distribution of antitrust enforcement. Persons
seeking to disturb that balance-and with respect to private
enforcement I am one of those-bear the burden of demonstrating
that less (or more) enforcement would benefit competition and the
consumers for whose protection the antitrust laws are principally
designed.

